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Decades of research suggest that talking on a cell phone interferes with driving 
performance, but the underlying mechanisms of this interference remain poorly 
understood. Driving and cell phone research often generalizes easy, novice laboratory 
tasks to the well practiced task of driving, and it frequently ignores important factors like 
emotion in tasks used to represent cell phone conversation. This experiment sought to 
address these issues. Participants performed a tracking task and two verbal tasks over 7 
one-hour sessions. At some times the tasks were performed individually, and at others the 
tracking task was performed concurrently with one of the verbal tasks. Participants 
watched an anger-inducing film clip at the beginning of the 7th session and were 
instructed to either down-regulate or maintain that anger. Results challenged the validity 







 Talking on one’s cell phone negatively affects driving ability. This dual-task 
interference is an exceptionally robust finding. The Center for Disease Control (2005) 
reported 43,527 motor vehicle-related fatalities in the United States, and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration reported that ten percent of individuals driving at 
any given time of day are using a hands free or handheld cell phone. Evidence that cell 
phone conversations impair driving performance comes from experimental research as 
well (e.g., Alm & Nilsson, 1994; Ishida & Matsuura, 2001; McKnight & McKnight, 
1993; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). The dangers of concurrent driving and cell phone use 
are generally accepted as common knowledge. However, the underlying mechanisms of 
this interference remain a mystery. 
Research typically highlights the risks associated with using a cell phone while 
driving, but rarely acknowledges the benefits (Haigney & Westerman, 2001). The ability 
to communicate with people in remote locations while driving makes it possible for 
drivers to conduct business from their cars, thus facilitating a more productive work day 
(Briem & Hedman, 1995; Faircloth, Ashby, Ross, & Parkes, 1991). This is especially 
relevant to individuals known as stretch commuters, who travel 50 miles or more to get 
from home to work. A National Household Travel Survey reported that 3.3 million 
Americans qualified as stretch commuters in 2004 (Smallen, 2004). Moreover, cell 
phones provide safety in some situations by enabling drivers to contact emergency 
services (Redelmeier & Tibshirani, 1997; Stein, Parseghian, & Allen, 1987). 
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A wide variety of research techniques have been used to study cell phone 
conversations and driving. Experiments have been conducted in real traffic (e.g., Brown, 
Tickner, & Simmonds, 1969; Ishida & Matsuura, 2001), in driving simulators (e.g., Alm 
& Nilsson, 1994; Strayer & Drews, 2007; Strayer, Drews, & Johnston, 2003), and in the 
laboratory with tasks that represent driving (e.g., Just, Keller, & Cynkar, 2008; Strayer & 
Johnston, 2001; Wester, Bockner, Volkerts, Verster, & Kenemans, 2008). To measure 
driving performance in the laboratory, studies have most commonly used pursuit tracking 
and braking tasks (Horrey & Wickens, 2006). Tasks used to simulate talking on a cell 
phone include dialing numbers (e.g., Salvucci & Macuga, 2002), mental arithmetic (e.g., 
McKnight & McKnight, 1993), verb generation (e.g., Strayer & Johnston, 2001), working 
memory tasks (e.g., Alm & Nilsson, 1995), and realistic conversation with a confederate 
(e.g., Strayer, et al., 2003). Research has measured physiological reactions with 
techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI, e.g., Just, et al., 2008), 
eye-tracking (e.g., Harbluk, Noy, Trbovich, & Eizenman, 2007), and event related 
potentials (ERP, e.g., Wester, et al., 2008).  
Researchers have conducted several meta-analyses to integrate data collected with 
this large variety of techniques. Horrey and Wickens (2006) conducted a meta-analysis 
on 23 studies that investigated the impact of cell phone conversation on driving using five 
moderating variables: measures of driving performance, handheld vs. hands free phones, 
conversation vs. information processing tasks, and simulator vs. field studies. They found 
that conversation affects reaction time (RT) to road events or discrete stimuli more than it 
affects tracking performance. Effects on driving performance did not statistically differ 
between handheld and hands free phones. Conversation tasks impacted RT measures of 
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driving performance more than information processing tasks. However, information 
processing tasks did produce substantial costs to performance.  
Another meta-analysis (Caird, Scialfa, Ho, & Smiley, 2004) examined effects of 
cell phone use on driving performance by including data from epidemiological and 
experimental studies. Like Horrey and Wickens (2006), they found no reliable 
differences in driving performance between handheld and hands free phones. The meta-
analysis suggested that, although older adults typically show larger cell phone-related 
decrements in performance, they are less likely than younger adults to regularly use cell 
phones while driving. Laboratory studies that used tasks based on driving implied 
stronger effects of cell phone use on driving performance than on-road and driving 
simulator studies. 
A meta-analysis conducted by Haigney and Westerman (2001) examined some 
methodological issues in lab-based driving and cell phone studies, such as defining 
procedures and terms, operazationalizing task elements, sampling task components, and 
using experimental controls. The analysis raised concerns for the ecological validity of 
tasks used in previous research. For example, there is uncertainty whether the variety of 
tasks used in studies accurately reflects the variety or balance of cognitive processing 
required for conversing on a cell phone while driving. Haigney and Westerman 
concluded that improvements in driving and cell phone research require a more detailed 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms involved in driving. 
Haigney and Westerman’s concerns about ecological validity are well 
exemplified by studies that use simplified perceptual-motor tasks to represent driving. 
Just et al. (2008) investigated the effects of auditory comprehension on fMRI activity and 
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performance on simulated driving. Participants performed a lane keeping task while lying 
in an MRI scanner. They viewed a car moving at a fixed speed down a virtual winding 
road and controlled the car by moving a mouse or tracking ball with their right hand. Just 
and colleagues found that a listening task impaired tracking performance, and described 
this as evidence that listening to someone speak “produces deterioration in driving 
performance” (pp. 70). Generalizing their results to real driving behavior may be 
dubious. 
In another study that used simple tasks to represent driving, Strayer and Johnston 
(2001) investigated different types of secondary tasks that might interfere with driving. 
They used a pursuit tracking task to represent driving, in which participants used a mouse 
to keep a cursor aligned with a circular object moving in sine wave patterns across a 
computer screen. In one of the two experiments, they included a braking task, in which 
participants pressed a button in response to the moving object occasionally turning red. 
They found that easy secondary tasks (i.e., shadowing speech, listening to radio 
broadcasts) did not impair tracking or braking performance, whereas harder secondary 
tasks (i.e., an information-generating verbal task, conversation with a confederate) did 
impair performance. They interpreted these results as evidence that talking on one’s cell 
phone interferes with driving by diverting attention to an engaging context unrelated to 
driving. 
Concerned with the ecological validity of their findings, Strayer and colleagues 
(Strayer, et al., 2003) conducted a similar experiment using a high fidelity driving 
simulator. Participants engaged in a car-following task while different dependent 
variables (e.g., break onset time, following distance) were recorded. Participants 
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conversed with a confederate as a secondary task, but the other secondary tasks from the 
2001 study were not used. Results showed that the conversation interfered with all of the 
driving dependent variables. The researchers described the study as a successful 
replication and extension of their findings from Strayer and Johnston (2001). 
1.1 Explanations for Interference 
Existing theories for the mechanisms of interference associated with driving and 
cell phone use are vague. One popular theory proposes that interference is caused by a 
kind of inattention blindness, which occurs when an individual fails to observe salient 
stimuli and distinct objects to which they have perceptual access (Simons, 2000). This 
Inattention Blindness hypothesis attributes the costs of cell phone use on driving to 
diverting attention away from driving to the conversation. Whereas this hypothesis 
focuses on the perceptual consequences of interference, other more established models 
focus more on the underlying structure of attention. 
Numerous explanations of the architecture of attention have been developed. 
Resource models are among the most well known hypotheses (c.f., Pashler, 1998). These 
models assume that there is a limited resource or resources that can be allocated to 
multiple tasks. Unitary Resource theories (Kahneman, 1973; McCleod, 1977) assume that 
multiple task performance is arbitrated by a single, amodal mental commodity that can be 
quantified, divided, and allocated (Wickens, 1991). Conversely, Multiple Resource 
theories assume that different tasks require different modality-specific sets of resources. 
Therefore, if two tasks demand separate resources (i.e., different input and output 
modalities), they may be performed concurrently with no interference (Navon & Gopher, 
1979).  
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Between these two classes of theories, Unitary Resource models better account 
for the evidence that talking on a cell phone (handheld or hands free) interferes with 
driving performance. Talking on one’s cell phone impairs driving ability, even though the 
tasks involve different modalities. Reduced to their most basic components, driving 
requires manual responses to visual stimuli, whereas conversation requires vocal 
responses to auditory stimuli. The inability to simultaneously perform these tasks well 
implicates an amodal source of attention. 
The Central Capacity Sharing model (Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003) is a prominent, 
more specific type of unitary resource model. It assumes that some processing stages are 
not capacity-limited and that other stages are. Specifically, central processing stages (i.e., 
response selection) are capacity-limited. Central resources must be shared among 
multiple competing tasks. When this processing capacity is shared, multiple tasks are 
processed more slowly than they would be individually. Because driving is a continuous 
activity, a prediction follows that a telephone conversation (which is also more or less 
continuous) will repeatedly overlap with driving at central processing stages.  
The model posits that while the capacity of central processing is limited, it may 
not be fixed. Rather, it may increase when more effort is expended on the tasks to be 
performed (Kahneman, 1973). It is reasonable to think that after countless hours spent 
driving, an individual may put less effort into their driving performance and therefore, 
have less processing capacity. This could be problematic in the event of a sudden and 
unexpected obstacle such as a squirrel running into the street. 
Although resource models provide explanations for dual-task interference in 
driving, they cannot necessarily quantify the stages of processing. Haigney and 
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Westerman (2001) proposed that improvements to research demand a better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of driving. Computational models of 
cognition can provide a more detailed and mechanistic account of driving. 
1.2 Computational Models of Dual-task Interference 
Human performance has often been studied with computational models of humans 
performing various tasks. One such architecture, Executive-Process/Interactive Control 
(EPIC), characterizes human performance of simultaneous perceptual-motor and 
cognitive processes (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Meyer, et al., 1995). 
Performance of various tasks is accomplished through a series of processing stages (i.e., 
stimulus encoding, response selection, and response execution) similar to discrete stage 
models (Sanders, 1980; Sternberg, 1969).  
EPIC’s principle components, which facilitate the processing stages, include 
distinct processing units (e.g., visual processor, auditory processor) that receive inputs 
from simulated physical effectors based on human physiology. These perceptual 
processors output information to a working memory store, which is controlled by a 
cognitive processor to perform various actions. The cognitive processor analyzes the 
inputs from the perceptual processors, selects appropriate responses, and sends them to 
motor processors, which prepare and execute movement through the physical effectors. 
In a dual-task situation, any of the processing stages (stimulus encoding, response 
selection, response execution) can operate in parallel. 
From the EPIC architecture, Meyer and Kieras formulated a class of Adaptive 
Executive Control (AEC) models that use executive processes to control the course of 
secondary task processing stages. According to these models, skills for performing 
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individual tasks are acquired by transforming declarative knowledge into procedural 
knowledge (Anderson, 1982; Bovair & Kieras, 1991). After sufficient practice has 
converted knowledge from declarative to procedural, EPIC’s cognitive processor can 
process and execute two tasks simultaneously if those two tasks use different sensory 
processing units.  
AEC models predict that perfect time sharing between two well-practiced tasks is 
possible when stimuli and responses use different modalities (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 
1997b; Schumacher, et al., 2001). Schumacher and colleagues tested this prediction by 
pairing an auditory-visual (AV) choice reaction task with a visual-manual (VM) choice 
reaction task. A dual-task trial entailed an auditory stimulus and a visual stimulus 
appearing concurrently, and participants were instructed to give equal priority to both 
tasks. After 5 or 6 sessions of practice, many of the participants achieved perfect time 
sharing. That is, they responded as quickly and accurately to the dual-task trials as the 
single-task trials. A series of experiments by Ruthruff, Hazeltine, and colleagues have 
also demonstrated that some individuals can be trained to simultaneously perform two 
tasks with different modality pairings without interference (Hazeltine & Ruthruff, 2006; 
Hazeltine, Ruthruff, & Remington, 2006; Hazeltine, Teague, & Ivry, 2002; Ruthruff, 
Hazeltine, & Remington, 2006; Ruthruff, Johnston, Van Selst, Whitsell, & Remington, 
2003).  
Driving a car and talking on a cell phone also require different modality pairings. 
A conversation requires attending to auditory inputs and producing vocal outputs, 
whereas driving primarily requires attending to visual inputs and producing manual 
outputs. For experienced drivers, the declarative knowledge demanded by these skills has 
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most likely been converted to procedural knowledge. Thus AEC models might predict 
that it is possible for these tasks to be performed simultaneously without interference. 
Adaptive Character of Thought (ACT-R) is another computational cognitive 
architecture. Like EPIC, it hypothesizes that complex cognition is mediated by an 
interaction between declarative and procedural knowledge (Anderson, 1993, 1996; 
Lebiere & Anderson, 1998). A variant of this architecture, ACT-R/PM (Perceptual-
Motor), integrates the ACT-R production system with a set of perceptual-motor modules 
inspired by EPIC (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). ACT-R/PM’s principle components include 
perceptual-motor modules for vision, movement, speech, and audition that communicate 
with a cognitive layer of declarative and production memory in which central cognition 
(viz., response selection) occurs. Central cognition and the perceptual-motor modules run 
parallel with each other, but, unlike EPIC, response selection in the cognitive layer is 
serial.  
ACT-R/PM predicts that different modality pairings and cognitively simple tasks 
can facilitate performance that resembles perfect time sharing. However, the serial 
cognitive layer of the architecture does not allow for actual parallel central processing 
(Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Instead, the model predicts that two easy tasks can be 
performed without interference when the central processing stages for the two tasks do 
not overlap. For example, if stimuli for an AV task and a VM task were presented 
simultaneously, encoding of the auditory stimulus could overlap with response selection 
for the VM task. Similarly, response selection for the AV task could overlap with the 
response execution stage of the VM task. Thus if response selection for one task is 
complete before response selection for the other task begins, performance would 
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resemble perfect time sharing. ACT-R/PM predicts that a perfect time sharing event is 
likely to occur only when the tasks demand minimal central processing. Therefore, this 
model might predict that more cognitively complex tasks like driving and conversation 
would entail overlapping central processing. 
1.3 Limitations of cell phone & driving research 
The interactions and mechanisms of cell phone use and driving are intrinsically 
difficult to study. Both behaviors are multifaceted and require cognitive and 
physiological demand characteristics that differ along numerous parameters. Task 
analysis of driving behavior further illustrates the complexities of driving. Fastermeier 
and Gstalter (2007) developed a framework for task analysis based on classifications of 
road traffic situations and a model of a driver’s information processing. The 
classifications of traffic situations yielded three main elements: road design, road layout, 
and traffic flow. Within these elements, they identified 16 categories of road type (e.g., 
two-lane rural road), 9 categories of road layout (e.g., signalized junction with traffic 
lights), and 6 categories of traffic flow (e.g., right turn). 
Fastermeier and Gstalter’s model of driver information processing produced an 
even more elaborate structure of elements and categories than the classifications of traffic 
situations. Basic driving behavior was divided into a navigational level and a control 
level. The control level included steering, speed control, supervision of car conditions 
(e.g., the speedometer), self assessment of driver state (e.g., fatigue), and control of 
selective attention. The category of control of selective attention included subcategories 
such as observing oncoming traffic and following traffic rules. 
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The variety of situations and subtasks possible for a cell phone conversation are 
arguably no simpler than those possible for driving. As with driving, different types of 
demand characteristics required are dependent on the situation. At a basic level, finding a 
number in a phone may involve perceptual and visual processing, whereas participating 
in a conversation may involve a combination of auditory, visual, and central processing. 
Such simple assumptions cannot be made for the content of conversations. The different 
types of demand characteristics could be affected by anything from the presence or 
absence of emotional content to the quality of the connection between the two phones 
(Haigney & Westerman, 2001). For example, an individual might be describing 
directions to a certain place. The difficulty of this task might depend on spatial 
processing, which is susceptible to individual differences (Hunt, 1978). These differences 
in the cognitive and physiological processing requirements of the two tasks are frequently 
ignored in research. Existing studies tend to adopt an assumption that characteristics of 
the driving task are constant and concentrate only on a small range of cell phone 
operations (Haigney & Westerman, 2001). 
Along with the complexities of driving and conversation, learning and practice 
effects are frequently ignored in cell phone and driving research. (Shinar, Tractinsky, & 
Compton, 2005). As an individual learns to drive, much of their improvement is based on 
the subtle and slowly developing improvements in the quality of information acquisition 
and processing (Mourant & Rockwell, 1972; Shinar, Meir, & Ben-Shoham, 1998). 
Practice is also emphasized in computational human processing models. In the EPIC 
architecture, practice is essential in transforming declarative knowledge to procedural 
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knowledge and thus facilitating skilled performance (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b, 
1999; Meyer, et al., 1995).  
According to some influential attention investigators (e.g., Posner & Snyder, 
1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), mental operations that are extensively practiced go 
through qualitative changes. Through practice, control processes are functionally 
reorganized from slow and capacity-limited to fast and automatic (Logan, 1988). On the 
other hand, some attention researchers (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1980) propose that rather 
than qualitative changes, practice facilitates quantitative changes in processing. Through 
practice, control processes become more efficient but do not undergo reorganization. 
Imaging research suggests that practice leads to both types of changes in processing 
(Schumacher, Hendricks, & D'Esposito, 2005). Both ideas present serious challenges to 
many one-session driving studies that use simple perceptual-motor tasks to represent 
driving (e.g., Just, et al., 2008; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). If an easy but unpracticed task 
(e.g., pursuit tracking) and a more complex but well practiced task (i.e., driving) involve 
control processes that differ in organization and efficiency, it may be inappropriate to 
generalize performance on one task to the other. 
Despite the importance of practice in driving, most cell phone and driving studies 
consist only of one session (Shinar, et al., 2005). This includes even the most well-known 
studies that have influenced legislation and subsequent research (e.g., Brown, et al., 1969; 
McKnight & McKnight, 1993; Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Although these studies remain 
influential, the limitations caused by lack of practice has been discussed in meta-analyses 
(e.g., McCartt, Hellinga, & Bratiman, 2006). It has also been reported that laboratory 
studies that use tasks representative of driving show much more dual-task interference 
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than on-road and simulator studies (Caird, et al., 2004). It is possible that on-road and 
simulator studies show less interference, in part, because the participants in these studies 
are already practiced with the driving tasks. 
In one study that did investigate the role of practice, Shinar, Tractinsky, and 
Compton (2005) gave participants five sessions to practice the driving and conversation 
tasks. To represent conversation, participants either performed math operations or 
conversed with a remote confederate. Interference with driving performance in these 
dual-task conditions was initially high, but decreased significantly over the five sessions. 
However, 5th session data did show impaired driving performance in the dual-task 
conditions. The results suggest that although there may be risks associated with cell 
phone use while driving, research has likely overestimated these risks. 
Practice is only one of many important components that are frequently ignored in 
research. Other variables include lack of emotional content in conversation, 
dissimilarities between experimental driving tasks and real driving behavior, and speed 
accuracy tradeoffs (Dressel & Atchley, 2008). These numerous issues have made it 
difficult to create research procedures that accurately quantify dual-task interference in a 
cell phone and driving context (Haigney & Westerman, 2001).  
1.4 Mechanisms of Interference 
Efficiently controlling a vehicle is a cognitively complex process that involves 
extracting and integrating information from multiple sources (Harbluk, Noy, & 
Eizenman, 2002). The majority of legislation regulating cell phone use assumes that 
impairments in driving are caused by peripheral factors like holding a phone to one’s ear. 
It is illegal in five stages to drive while talking on a handheld cell phone, but there are no 
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bans in the United States against hands free cell phones (Govenors Highway Safety 
Administration, 2008). However, as mentioned previously, meta-analyses suggest that 
hands free cell phones are no safer than their handheld counterparts (Caird, et al., 2004; 
Horrey & Wickens, 2006), implying that central, instead of – or in addition to – 
peripheral, processes are the locus of interference.  
Most driving and cell phone research implicates central cognition as the key locus 
of interference; however, it is still unclear whether tasks that require attention (but not 
necessarily response selection) interfere with driving performance. Some research 
suggests that tasks like attending to verbal information and shadowing speech interfere 
with driving performance; some research suggests that they do not. For example, 
Pizzighello and Bressan (2008) conducted a study in which they instructed observers to 
watch a visual display while simultaneously listening to short stories or lists of words. 
During the experiment, an unexpected visual object appeared on the display. Results 
showed that attending to either of the verbal streams reduced the probability of detecting 
the appearance of the visual object. 
Recarte and Nunes (2003) also demonstrated that a task without response 
selection can potentially interfere with driving. Participants drove while performing one 
of two secondary tasks: one task required vocal responses and the other required listening 
only. They found that both secondary tasks impaired spatial gaze concentration and 
visual-detection. However, the listening task created significantly less interference than 
the vocal response task. 
Other studies suggest that easy attentional tasks do not interfere with driving 
performance. For example, McCarley and colleagues (2004) investigated change 
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detection while driving in dual-task scenarios. Participants conversing on a hands free 
cell phone showed impaired performance in detecting changes in traffic scenes. However, 
listening to prerecorded conversations from other participants did not interfere with 
change detection performance.  
Strayer and Johnston (2001) found that engaging in conversation interfered with 
performance on pursuit tracking and braking tasks, but listening to radio broadcasts did 
not. Moreover, a task requiring listening and speech production (mentioned earlier) 
produced no observable interference. In this task, an experimenter read a word to the 
participant every 10 to 20 seconds, and the participant repeated that word. There were no 
reliable differences between driving performance in this condition and in the single-task 
driving condition. This study suggests that listening to auditory inputs and producing 
vocal outputs, by themselves, do not demand enough attention to disrupt driving 
performance. Instead, it appears that attending to visual inputs is disrupted by the central 
processing involved in conversation (Strayer, et al., 2003). However, as discussed earlier 
in this section, some studies have found evidence that tasks requiring little or no central 
processing can interfere with driving (e.g., Pizzighello & Bressan, 2008; Recarte & 
Nunes, 2003). 
1.5 Emotion Regulation 
The failure to consider emotion’s impact on performance is a common criticism 
of cell phone and driving research (Haigney & Westerman, 2001; McCartt, et al., 2006). 
Survey research suggests that up to 65% of naturally occurring conversations from 
vehicles involve intense verbal negotiation (McCartt, et al., 2006). Experimental studies 
often attempt to simulate conversation with verbal transformation and number-based 
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tasks (e.g., Boase, 1988; Brown, et al., 1969; Faircloth, et al., 1991). These tasks, meant 
to represent conversation, have been criticized as lacking ecological validity (e.g., 
Brookhuis, Devries, & Dewaard, 1991; Shinar, et al., 2005).  
Cell phone conversations are capable of changing a driver’s emotional state (e.g., 
angry, happy, sad), which may also affect driving performance. Within the literature on 
emotion’s effects on performance, there is extensive evidence that heightened emotion, 
by itself, does not reliably interfere with performance in perceptual-motor and 
information processing tasks. However, attempts to down-regulate or stifle emotion have 
been repeatedly shown to impair task performance (e.g., Richards & Gross, 2000; 
Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). 
Emotion regulation is composed of external and internal processes that monitor, 
assess, and alter emotional reactions to achieve one’s goal (Thompson, 1994). Emotion 
regulation is believed to operate on multiple levels of cognition. The cognitive processes 
used in emotion regulation may be controlled or automatic, conscious or unconscious, 
and located at different stages in the process of generating emotions (Green & Malhi, 
2006). Research on emotion regulation investigates how and to what extent people can 
control which emotions they experience, when they experience them, and how they 
express them (Gross, 1998).  
There has been controversy over whether emotion regulation is a necessary 
adaptive strategy or a dangerous habit (Gross & Levenson, 1997). Most medical research 
supports the latter account (Hosie, Milne, & McArthur, 2005). For example, continuously 
suppressing anger has been linked to increased risk for coronary heart disease, 
hypertension, and less severe problems such as recurring headaches (Gallacher, Yarnell, 
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Sweetnam, Elwood, & Stansfeld, 1999; Venable, Carlson, & Wilson, 2001). More 
recently, psychological research has established the value of emotion regulation (Hosie, 
et al., 2005). For example, constantly expressing feelings of anger can lead to detrimental 
social consequences such as marriage and family problems, destruction to property, and 
decreased levels of efficiency in the workplace (Deffenbacher, Oetting, Lynch, & Morris, 
1996). However, it should be noted that the consequences of emotion regulation 
processes depend heavily upon the specific strategies used (Gross, 2002). 
Regardless of whether the benefits of regulating one’s emotions outweigh the 
costs, extensive research has found emotion regulation to be cognitively taxing, impairing 
performance in working memory and other information processing tasks (Baumeister, 
Vohs, & Tice, 2007; Richards, 2004; Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). For example, 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) demonstrated that emotion regulation 
negatively affects performance on information processing tasks. Participants watched an 
emotionally evocative film and were given one of two instructions. Half were told to not 
show or feel any emotion, and half were told to “let their emotions flow” during the 
movie. After the movie, participants were given anagrams to solve. The groups instructed 
to feel the emotions elicited by the film solved the anagrams with nearly twice as much 
success as the group told not to show or feel emotions. 
Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields (2009) investigated the effects of emotion regulation 
on young and older adults. After practicing a working memory task, participants watched 
a short film clip that has been shown to induce disgust (Shiota & Levenson, 2008). They 
were given instructions to either down-regulate any negative emotions or to maintain any 
negative emotions. There was also a group that was not given emotion regulatory 
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instructions and a group that watched a neutral film clip. After watching the film clip, 
participants performed the same working memory task as earlier in the experiment. In the 
emotion down-regulation group, young adults showed decrements in performing the task, 
whereas older adults showed improved performance. Performance on the working 
memory task was not affected by instructions to maintain negative emotions. Results 
suggest that efficient emotion regulation is a skill mastered only later in life. 
1.6 Ego Depletion Model 
The Ego Depletion model attempts to explain the negative effects of emotion 
regulation on performance and memory (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, et al., 1998). The 
model centers around the idea that an individual’s acts of volition (i.e., choosing and 
making decisions, assuming responsibility, inhibiting behavior, planning actions and 
executing those plans) draw on a limited resource, similar to strength or energy. Thus an 
act of volition will detrimentally impact subsequent acts (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, et al., 
1998). Self-regulation, for example, entails withstanding temptation and therefore 
overrides motivated behaviors. Exerting the control needed for this act draws on this 
limited reserve of strength and may quickly exhaust it (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 
1998). 
A major element of the Ego Depletion model is the hypothesis that the strength 
required in a variety of the self’s operations is taken from a single source. That is, the 
same resource is used in self-regulatory functions, including emotion regulation and 
performance regulation. Another hypothesis of this model is that this source of strength 
or energy is limited (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000). Together, these hypotheses 
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imply that an individual’s ability to down-regulate an emotion will directly compete with 
that individual’s ability to perform information processing and perceptual-motor tasks.  
The Ego Depletion model bears a strong resemblance to Kahneman’s Unitary 
Resource theory (1973), which many researchers have provided evidence against (e.g., 
Wickens, 1980). Moreover, there is ample behavioral and computational evidence that 
attention is, to some extent, modality-specific (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; 
Schumacher, et al., 2001). Perhaps this conflict can be resolved with an idea that there are 
multiple layers of cognitive processing. For example, basic perceptual-motor tasks may 
involve a modality-specific simple cognitive layer, and more complicated information 
generating tasks may involve an amodal complex cognitive layer. This would 
accommodate evidence for the Ego Depletion model’s unitary source of energy (e.g., 
Baumeister, Dale, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994) and evidence for models like EPIC that assume modality-
specific processors (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Schumacher, et al., 2001). 
1.7 Current Experiment 
Regardless of cognitive structure, almost all research on cell phone use and 
driving suggests that performing both of these tasks at the same time presents statistically 
significant safety risks. Among the many multiple-task theories and architectures, there 
are some (e.g., Capacity Sharing) that account for the literature better than others (e.g., 
Multiple Resource). Studies on this topic frequently ignore vital aspects of real world 
behavior such as practice effects in driving and emotional content in the conversation. 
Perhaps these and other flaws in the research are why the specific underlying 
mechanisms of interference of cell phone use on driving remain unknown. The current 
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experiment addresses these problems by investigating three critical features as they apply 
to concurrent cell phone use and driving: the practice effects of driving tasks in the 
laboratory, the underlying mechanisms of interference of multi-task performance, and the 
effects of emotion and emotion regulation on driving performance. 
In the current study, participants performed a driving task under various 
conditions. All participants completed a practice session and six additional sessions. 
Similar to Strayer and Johnston (2001), a pursuit tracking task represented driving, and 
two verbal tasks served as secondary (cell phone) tasks. One verbal task required 
listening and speaking but little semantic processing, and the other task involved vocally 
generating semantic information in response to auditory stimuli. During the final session, 
an emotion, anger, was induced. Half of the participants were instructed to down-regulate 
any negative emotions, and the other half were instructed to maintain any negative 
emotions. This allowed investigation of the mechanisms of dual-task interference, and the 
effects of practice, emotion, and emotion regulation on tasks to represent driving and 






Fifteen participants (8 males, 7 females; ages 19 – 28, mean = 21.7) from the 
Georgia Institute of Technology participated in this study. The participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision and hearing. Participants were required to have had a valid 
driver’s license for at least two years and to speak English as a first language. They 
received $70 or $77 (based on performance) for approximately 7 hours of participation.  
2.2 Stimuli and Apparatus 
Volunteers participated in seven sessions sitting approximately 72 cm from two 
computer monitors in a quiet, semi-dark room. They performed a pursuit tracking task on 
an IBM laptop in which they used a Logitech optical mouse to keep a cursor aligned with 
a moving target. They performed a verbal task on an IBM desktop. Dell speakers 
presented the verbal task stimuli, and an Audio Technica microphone recorded vocal 
responses. The tasks were programmed using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). In the final session,  participants watched a short film clip from the 
film Cry Freedom (Briley & Woods, 1987). The clip depicts soldiers in South Africa 
attacking a group of civilians who had been peacefully protesting racial discrimination 
laws. 
2.3 Tasks and Design 
The primary tracking task replicates the task from Experiment 2 of Strayer and 
Johnston (2001). Participants controlled a mouse with their right hand to keep a black 
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cross-shaped cursor on a white computer screen aligned as closely as possible with a 
circular moving target. The screen’s refresh rate was 33 ms, and the target’s course was 
determined by the sum of three randomly generated sine waves. Target movement was 
unpredictable, yet smooth and continuous.  
Participants also performed two types of secondary verbal tasks throughout the 
experiment: a paired associate (PA) task and a verb generation (VG) task. The PA task 
required participants to respond to a spoken noun with a previously memorized, 
semantically unrelated verb. Natural Reader 7, software that transforms text into speech, 
generated sound files of the spoken words. There were a total of eight word pairs, and all 
16 nouns and verbs consisted of one syllable. The list of paired associates was the same 
for all participants throughout all sessions. The nouns in half of the word pairs pertained 
to the clip from Cry Freedom (i.e., child, dirt, road, wound), whereas half were unrelated 
(i.e., lamb, pear, seed, vest) 1
The VG task required participants to vocalize a verb related to a spoken noun 
presented through Natural Reader 7 software. The stimuli consisted of over 1000 nouns 
taken from the MRC Psycholinguistics database (Wilson, 1988). A total of 700 words 
were used. The criteria for the selected words included concreteness and familiarity 
ratings between 400 and 700 (ratings for these categories range from 100 to 700). All 
words consisted of three or fewer syllables and 4-8 letters. Each word was presented only 
.  
                                                 
 
 
1There were two primary reasons for using words semantically related to the film in the verbal tasks. First, 
the anger incited by the film was meant to persist throughout the session, and it is difficult to determine the 
duration of emotions elicited by films. By using content related to the film for the verbal tasks, participants 
were more likely to remember the film, and thus more likely to maintain their anger. Second, the semantic 
relationships made the verbal tasks more representative of an actual argument. When individuals argue, the 
content of their conversations typically relates to the source of conflict. 
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once (480 words) or twice (220 words) for individual participants throughout the 7 
sessions. Words never repeated themselves in the same session. Words were distributed 
evenly across the sessions based on concreteness, familiarity, number of syllables, and 
letter count. Thirty-one percent of the VG nouns used in session 7 were related to the film 
clip (e.g., soldier, blood).  
During session 7, participants were shown a film clip intended to make them 
angry. The film clip has been shown to reliably induce anger in male and female 
participants of various ethnic backgrounds (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Hewig, et al., 2005; 
Philippot, 1993).  Windows Media Player played the film clip (Briley & Woods, 1987) 
on the laptop computer, while the desktop showed a blank screen.  
There were two experimental groups in this experiment: emotion down-regulation 
and maintenance control. After watching the film clip during the final session, 
participants in the emotion down-regulation group were told, 
The movie you just saw probably caused you to experience a negative emotional reaction. 
When working on the next tasks, we would like you to down-regulate that negative 
emotion as fast as you can. At the same time, remember it is important that you do a good 
job in performing the other tasks.  
Participants in the maintenance control group were told, 
The movie you just saw probably caused you to experience a negative emotional reaction. 
When working on the next tasks, we would like you to maintain the intensity of your 
negative reaction to the film. Just keep your negative feelings going and do not try to 
change them in any way. At the same time, remember it is important that you do a good 
job in performing the other tasks.  
Throughout the experiment, participants completed emotion self report 
inventories similar to those used in Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009). Participants 
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reported the extent to which they felt each of eight emotions on a 5-point scale, from 1 
(very slightly) to 5 (extremely). The emotions (anger, anxiety, contentment, disgust, 
frustration, happiness, interest, and sadness) were presented in a random order each time 
the inventory was administered. For the first 6 sessions, the self report inventories were 
used to check for strong negative emotions that could potentially influence performance. 
In session 7, the inventories were used to measure the initial effects of the film on the 
participants, and whether they were following their emotion down-regulation or 
maintenance control instructions. 
2.4 Procedure 
Each participant completed the seven sessions within three weeks and completed 
session 7 no more than a day after session 6. In session 1, the participants read and signed 
a consent form and completed an abbreviated version of the Unsafe Driving Behaviors 
Questionnaire (Administration, 1998). The participants learned and practiced the three 
tasks (tracking, PA, VG) individually. These single-task blocks amounted to 8 minutes of 
tracking (over 2 blocks), 89 trials of the PA task (over 4 blocks), and 67 trials of the VG 
task (over 3 blocks). The order in which participants learned the tasks was 
counterbalanced. At the end of the session, participants practiced two dual-task blocks for 
four minutes each. 
Throughout the experiment, the tracking and verbal tasks, as well as the 
combinations of those tasks, resulted in 5 different block types. Three of these were 
single-task blocks: tracking, PA, and VG. The two dual-task blocks consisted of 
simultaneous tracking and PA tasks (tracking-PA) and simultaneous tracing and VG tasks 
(tracking-VG). The single-task tracking and dual-task blocks lasted for 4 minutes, and the 
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single-task verbal blocks lasted for 2 minutes. In all but the single-task tracking block, E-
Prime 2.0 presented the spoken words at randomized intervals of 4, 6, 8, and 10 seconds. 
Dual-task verbal blocks included 34 verbal task trials, and single-task verbal blocks 
included 17 trials. 
In sessions 2 through 6, participants completed a brief warm-up of shortened 
dual- and single-task blocks. The single-task blocks consisted of 1 minute of tracking, 10 
trials of the PA task and 10 trials of the VG task. Dual-task practice blocks included a 2 
minute tracking-PA block and a 2 minute tracking-VG block. After the warm-up, 
participants performed two cycles of the 5 block types. The order of the blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants, but the order remained constant within each 
participant. After session 6, participants were placed into the emotion down-regulation 
group or the maintenance control group based on their tracking performance over 
sessions 2 through 6, with a focus on session 6 (as this session acted as a control for 
session 7). Group placement was delayed until this time to ensure that both groups began 
session 7 with similar levels of performance, and to make the experiment double-blind 
for as long as possible. 
Session 7 began with a self report inventory and a warm-up, as in the other 
sessions. The experimenter then said, 
You may find some of the events depicted in this clip upsetting. Nevertheless it is 
important that you watch the film as carefully as possible. You may look away if 
you find any images too distressing and if you find the film too upsetting, feel free 
to leave the room. 
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The experimenter left the room while the participant watched the film clip from Cry 
Freedom. After the film, the participant completed a self report inventory to determine 
the initial effects of the film. The experimenter then instructed participants to either 
down-regulate or maintain any negative emotions experienced during the film. 
The participant then continued to perform the two cycles of the block types. 
Between blocks, participants completed additional self report inventories to monitor their 
success in following their instructions. Immediately before each block, a screen with 
images from the film clip and a written reminder of their emotion instructions appeared 
for 5 seconds. 
After the tracking and verbal blocks, participants rated the 8 nouns and 8 verbs 
used in the PA task and all of the nouns used in the VG task during session 7 in terms of 
how much they related to the film clip. Relatedness was rated on a 5-point scale from 1 





3.1 Outlier Removal 
Root mean squared error (RMSE) of the cursor from the target provided a 
measure of tracking performance. Outlier removal began with dividing the 4 minute 
blocks into 14 sections (the number of times the target moved across the screen in a 
block). The mean RMSE was calculated within each block, and sections were removed if 
their average was greater than three standard deviations above the mean of that block. 
This procedure excluded 1.5% of the tracking data from analysis. Reaction times and 
accuracies of the paired associate and verb generation tasks assessed verbal task 
performance. Incorrect trials and trials with an RT over 3000ms were excluded from the 
analysis. This procedure excluded 1.2% of PA trials and 3.8% of VG trials. 
3.2 Tracking 
Three of the 15 participants failed to perform the primary task adequately, and 
their data were excluded from the analyses. A repeated measures ANOVA of tracking 
RMSE data collected during sessions 2 through 6 showed a statistically significant main 
effect of session, F(4,44) = 3.474, p = .015 (see Figure 1). The analysis also revealed a 
reliable main effect of secondary task on tracking performance, F(2,22) = 4.486, p = 
.041. A Hynh-Feldt correction was used for this p-value, because the secondary task 
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variable violated the sphericity assumption2
 
. Planned comparisons showed that 
performing either of the verbal tasks interfered reliably with tracking performance. The 
interaction between session and secondary task approached significance, F(8,88) = 1.816, 
p = .085.   
Figure 1: Tracking Data for Session 2 through Session 7. 
Root mean square error for the tracking task across sessions. 
 
 
Within session 2, there was a reliable main effect of secondary task, F(2,22) = 
8.734, p = .002. Planned comparisons showed that tracking performance was impaired by 
a secondary PA task, F(1,11), = 9.621, p = .010, and a secondary VG task F(1,11) = 
13.053, p = .004. The difference in tracking performance between PA and VG blocks was 
                                                 
 
 














not reliable. Within session 3, there was also a main effect of secondary task, F(2,22) = 
3.566, p = .046, but planned comparisons revealed that tracking performance was 
impaired by the VG task only, F(1,11) = 6.216, p = .030. Thus the PA task did not 
reliably interfere with the tracking task by session 3. Within sessions 4, 5, and 6, tracking 
data were not affected by the secondary task. 
The interaction between session and secondary task was investigated further by 
investigating the first (session 2) and last (session 6) sessions only.  These data are less 
likely to be affected by participant differences in learning and performance across the 
intermediate sessions. A repeated measures ANOVA of tracking data from session 2 and 
session 6 showed main effects of session, F(1,11) = 7.392, p = .020, and secondary task, 
F(2,22) = 3.584, p = .045, as well as an interaction between session and secondary task, 
F(2,22) = 5.004, p = .016. 
3.3 Paired Associate 
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT data for the PA task during sessions 2 
through 6 showed a significant main effect of session, F(4,40) = 13.166, p < .001 (see 
Figure 2). RT was slower when the participant was concurrently performing the tracking 
task (dual-task) than when performing the PA task alone (single-task), F(1,10) = 5.854, p 
= .036. Session did not interact reliably with task type (single-task, dual-task). 
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Figure 2: Paired Associate Reaction Time Data for Session 2 through Session 7. 
Mean reaction times for the paired associate task across sessions. 
 
 
Like the tracking data, the PA data from only session 2 and session 6 were 
analyzed. A statistically significant main effect of session emerged, F(1,10) = 51.858, p < 
.001, but there was no reliable effect of task type on PA performance. An arcsine 
transformation was applied to the error rates from sessions 2 and 6 to stabilize the 
variance (Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller, & Nizam, 1998), and the transformed data were 
analyzed with a repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis showed that participants were 






















Figure 3: Paired Associate Accuracy Data for Session 2 and Session 6. 
Percentage of correctly answered paired associate trials. 
 
 
3.4 Verb Generation 
A repeated measures ANOVA on RT data for the VG task during sessions 2 
through 6 revealed a statistically significant main effect of session, F(4,40) = 3.269, p = 
.021, but no reliable effect of task type (see Figure 4). However, session and task type 
reliably interacted with each other, F(4,40) = 5.559, p < .001. Before extensive practice, 
participants responded more quickly to the VG task while concurrently performing the 
tracking task than while performing the VG task alone. By session 6, participants 
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Figure 4: Verb Generation Reaction Time Data for Session 2 through Session 7.  
Mean reaction times for the verb generation task across sessions. 
 
 
Analysis of only session 2 and session 6 data failed to show significant main 
effects, but the interaction was significant, F(1,10) = 5.192, p = .046. An arcsine 
transformation was applied to the error rates from sessions 2 and 6 to stabilize the 
variance (Kleinbaum, et al., 1998), and the transformed data were analyzed with a 
repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis did not show a reliable effect of trial type, 
F(1,10) = .574, p = .466. During session 2, participants responded correctly to the VG 
task for 95.4% of the dual-task trials and 96.5% of the single-task trials. During session 6, 
participants responded correctly to 97.1% of the dual-task trials and 97.3% of the single-
task trials. 
3.5 Session 6 and Session 7 
Telling participants to down-regulate or maintain negative emotions failed to 
produce any reliable effects on tracking RMSE (see Figure 5). The interaction between 
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secondary task, F(2,20) = 1.013, p = .381, and the three-way interaction of condition, 
session and secondary task, F(2,20) = .583, p = .567, were not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 5: Tracking Data for the Maintenance Control and Emotion Regulation 
Groups for Session 6 and Session 7.  
Root mean square error for the tracking task. 
 
 
Moving beyond the between groups variable, repeated measures ANOVAs on 
session 6 and session 7 data showed a statistically significant effect of session on PA RT, 
F(1,9) = 10.331, p = .011 (see Figure 6 and Table 1), but no reliable effects on tracking 
RMSE, PA accuracy, VG RT, or VG accuracy. Participants responded more slowly to the 























Figure 6: Paired Associate Reaction Time Data for Session 6 and Session 7.  
 
 
Mean RTs to the film-related words in the PA task (i.e., child, dirt, road, wound) 
were compared with RTs to the unrelated words (i.e., lamb, pear, seed, vest) during 
sessions 6 and 7, but the factors (session and word relatedness) did not reliably interact, 
F(1,9) = 2.052, p = .186. Within the VG task, nouns that were related to the film clip did 
not elicit RTs significantly different from unrelated nouns (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Mean Reaction Time Data for Verbal Tasks.  
Reaction times to nouns related and unrelated to the film for sessions 6 and 7 for the 
paired associate task and session 7 of the verb generation task. 
 PA PA VG 
 Session 6 Session 7 Session 7 
Related 908 977 1809 





















The mostly null results of session 7 may suggest that the manipulations of anger 
and the instructions were ineffective, but the self report data suggest otherwise. Anger 
ratings taken immediately after the film (but before the instructions) were reliably greater 
than ratings taken immediately before, F(1,9) = 27.026, p = .001 (see Figure 7). For 
unexplained reasons, time (pre-film, post-film) interacted with condition (emotion 
regulation, maintenance control), F(1,9) = 12.774, p = .006, even though the conditions 
were identical at the time of the reports. Although the groups were counterbalanced for 
age and gender (in addition to tracking performance), the emotion regulation group 
reported larger increases in anger after the film than the maintenance control group.  
 
 
Figure 7: Self Report Data in Session 7.  




After instructing participants to down-regulate or maintain negative emotions, 


















post-instructions) interacted significantly with condition, F(1,9) = 7.628, p = .022. The 
emotion regulation group reported marginally reduced anger, F(1,4) = 4.571, p = .099, 





A paired associate task and a verb generation task individually impaired 
performance on a pursuit tracking task after 1 session of practice; however, dual-task 
interference to tracking performance was eliminated by 6 sessions of practice. 
Concerning performance on the verbal tasks, the pursuit tracking task slowed reaction 
times in the PA and VG tasks throughout sessions 5 and 6. Inducing anger with a film 
clip during session 7 did not lead to changes in the tracking and VG tasks but did lead to 
slower RTs in the PA task. Participants showed no differences in performance in session 
7 whether they down-regulated or maintained negative emotions caused by the 
unpleasant film clip. 
During session 2, both the PA and VG tasks impaired tracking performance. 
These results are consistent with one session dual-task studies that use easy tasks to 
represent driving and cell phone conversation  (e.g., Strayer & Johnston, 2001). By 
session 3, the VG task continued to interfere with tracking performance, but participants 
were able to perform the PA task without tracking interference. In other words, VG-
related interference to the tracking task remained longer than PA-related interference. 
This is consistent with the prediction that an information-generating verbal task would 
interfere with pursuit tracking more than a simpler word pair verbal task.  
During sessions 4 through 6, neither of the secondary verbal tasks interfered with 
tracking performance. These results suggest that people can successfully perform a 
practiced continuous task without interference from a practiced verbal task. This is 
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partially consistent with Shinar et al. (2005), who found that 5 sessions of practice greatly 
reduced, but did not eliminate, dual-task interference on a driving task. However, Shinar 
and colleagues used a high fidelity driving simulator and used multiple dependent 
variables to assess driving performance, including average speed, speed variance, and 
average lane position. The task of keeping a mouse cursor aligned with a moving target 
was likely mastered more easily. 
The successful elimination of dual-task interference on the tracking task raises an 
important question: How was the interference eliminated? It is well-known that practice 
can lead to a task being performed more quickly, more accurately, and with less 
susceptibility to interference from other tasks. However, information processing theorists 
frequently disagree over how these changes are facilitated. Some theorists (e.g. Logan, 
1988; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) argue that performance on a novel task is mediated by 
capacity-limited control processes, whereas performance on a well-practiced task is 
mediated by mostly automatic processes that are not capacity-limited. That is, practice 
facilitates a qualitative shift from slow, capacity-limited performance to automatic 
performance. On the other hand, some theorists (e.g., Newell & Rosenbloom, 1980) 
argue that practice changes the efficiency but not the functional organization of control 
processes needed for task performance. That is, practice facilitates a quantitative shift 
from less to more efficient processing. 
The elimination of dual-task interference on the tracking task seems, at first, to 
favor a qualitative change. After moderate practice, participants made frequent vocal 
responses to an auditory task without interfering with a continuous visual-manual task. 
Practice may have facilitated a transformation from declarative to procedural knowledge, 
 39 
thereby allowing central processing stages of the tasks to operate in parallel (Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Schumacher, et al., 2001). Alternatively, practice may have 
allowed one or more of the tasks to become automatized, thereby making it possible to 
bypass the capacity-limited central stages of processing (Logan, 1988). Either way, 
processing would have been fundamentally reorganized. 
However, there are reasons to doubt this account of qualitative shift. Although a 
tracking task appears continuous, some theorists (e.g., Craik, 1947; Pashler, 1998) have 
argued that tracking elicits intermittent reactions (about two per second) to correct for 
error in the position of the cursor. If pursuit tracking can be performed with a series of 
discrete stages, it is possible that central processing for the two tasks did not occur in 
parallel or automatically. Instead, a quantitative shift may have occurred, making 
processing more efficient, but not fundamentally different, from novice performance. 
This could be explained by the Stage Shortening hypothesis, which would posit that 
central processing on practiced tasks is faster but still serial (Byrne & Anderson, 2001; 
Ruthruff, Van Selst, Johnston, & Remington, 2006). Ruthruff and colleagues suggest that 
practice can reduce the time of the central processing stages to the extent that the central 
stages of multiple tasks no longer overlap. Thus two tasks can be performed 
simultaneously without interference, but central processing remains serial. 
A qualitative or quantitative shift caused by practice presents problems for many 
one-session driving and cell phone studies. Evidence that cell phone conversation impairs 
driving performance often comes from studies in which participants perform easy but 
unpracticed tasks to represent driving and cell phone conversations (e.g., Strayer & 
Johnston, 2001; Wester, et al., 2008). These techniques are sufficient to answer specific 
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questions about cognitive and motor control, but generalizing the results to real world 
driving behavior may be inappropriate. One cannot assume that interference to an easy 
novice task is fundamentally equivalent to interference to a multifaceted, well-practiced 
task. 
Although this study was primarily concerned with the effects of verbal tasks on 
tracking performance, the verbal task data themselves have interesting implications. For 
example, dual-task costs to PA performance persisted throughout sessions 2 through 6. 
That is, participants responded more slowly to PA stimuli during blocks in which they 
also performed the tracking task than blocks in which they performed the PA task alone. 
Participants were also less accurate during the dual-task blocks, which suggests that dual-
task interference in the PA task did not result from a speed-accuracy tradeoff. It is 
noteworthy that dual-task interference was overcome in the tracking but not paired 
associate performance. Because the participants were told that the tracking task was more 
important, perhaps they learned to schedule their vocal and manual responses in a way 
that prioritized the primary task. 
The effects of practice on verb generation performance are less straightforward. 
For sessions 2 and 3, VG task RTs were faster during dual-task blocks than single-task 
blocks. After session 4, single-task RTs became faster than dual-task RTs. This shift in 
VG task performance was accompanied by the disappearance of dual-task interference to 
the tracking task. Perhaps participants found the VG task especially difficult in the early 
sessions. The task itself is less constrained than the tracking and PA tasks, and it demands 
more use of long-term memory (viz., to retrieve semantically related verbs). Perceived 
difficulty of the VG task accounts well for the large costs to tracking performance seen in 
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sessions 2 and 3. After becoming more comfortable with the task through practice, the 
participants may have become better able to schedule their responses in a way that 
prioritized the primary tracking task. 
The disappearance of dual-task interference on the tracking task but not the verbal 
tasks suggests that the participants actively used strategies to maximize performance. The 
strategy for the PA task stayed constant across sessions; interference to the tracking task 
disappeared fairly early in practice, whereas interference to the PA task remained. The 
VG task data suggest a strategy shift. Early in practice, participants prioritized the VG 
task which interfered with the tracking task. Later in practice, they were able to prioritize 
the tracking task which interfered with the VG task. 
These shifts in performance over the course of practice are well accounted for by 
cognitive architectures such as Executive-Process/Interactive Control (EPIC; Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a, 1997b, 1999; Meyer, et al., 1995) and Adaptive Control of Thought: 
Perceptual Motor (ACT-R/PM; Byrne & Anderson, 2001). According to EPIC, the 
individual develops Adaptive Executive Control (AEC), in which executive processes 
control the course of secondary task processing stages (Meyer & Kieras, 1997a, 1997b, 
1999). Thus processing stages for the tracking and verbal tasks can be organized in a way 
that optimizes tracking performance. 
AEC models may not account as well for the remaining dual-task interference to 
the verbal tasks. AEC models predict that perfect time sharing between two well-
practiced tasks is possible when stimuli and responses use different modalities (Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a, 1997b; Schumacher, et al., 2001). The interference of the visual-manual 
tracking task to the auditory-vocal verbal tasks might be better explained by ACT-R/PM. 
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This architecture’s perceptual-motor modules run parallel with each other, but response 
selection at the central cognition level is serial.  
However, the absence of perfect time sharing might also be explained by the 
instructions to prioritize the tracking task, as opposed to serial response selection 
constraints. Schumacher and colleagues (2001) have shown that individuals can achieve 
perfect time sharing with well-practiced, modality compatible tasks when instructed to 
give the tasks equal priority. They were then able to reintroduce dual-task interference in 
a group of practiced participants by putting the tasks in a context that encouraged task 
prioritization. Therefore, AEC cannot be discarded as a possible explanation. Participants 
may have developed and adapted their control strategies in a way that complimented the 
instructions to prioritize tracking, as opposed to a way that would result in perfect time 
sharing. 
In session 7, participants watched an anger-inducing film clip before performing 
the tracking and verbal tasks. Dual-task interference reemerged in tracking performance; 
participants showed less tracking error during single-task tracking blocks than dual-task 
tracking-VG blocks. This implies that emotion may affect tracking performance when 
paired with an information-generating verbal task. However, the effect of emotion on 
tracking might be spurious. Comparisons of tracking performance between sessions 6 and 
7 revealed no significant differences. 
Participants received instructions to either down-regulate or maintain any 
negative emotions caused by the film, but the instructions had no effect on performance. 
This is inconsistent with evidence that emotion regulation impairs young adults on other 
tasks (e.g., Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009), which raises questions concerning the 
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effectiveness of the instruction manipulation. However, the self report data suggest that 
the manipulation worked. Participants indicated increased anger after seeing the film clip 
and before receiving instructions. After being told to down-regulate or maintain negative 
emotions caused by the film, the emotion regulation group reported marginally less anger 
and the maintenance control group reported sustained levels of anger. 
Assuming participants followed the emotion regulation instructions, the complete 
absence of effects suggests that people can regulate emotion without interference to 
practiced visual tracking and auditory verbal tasks. This may suggest that cognitive 
control and emotion control rely on separate processes. That is, cognitive and emotion 
control do not interfere with one another because they do not compete for the same 
resources. This idea is inconsistent with the Ego Depletion hypothesis (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, et al., 1998), which posits that the energy required in a variety of the self’s 
operations is taken from a single, limited source. Thus an individual’s ability to down-
regulate an emotion will directly compete with that individual’s ability to perform 
information processing and perceptual-motor tasks. 
Another explanation for the lack of interference created by the emotion regulation 
goal relies on the previously discussed differences between novice and practiced 
performance. Before the qualitative and quantitative shifts in processing, novice 
performance may rely heavily on general purpose control processes. Two novel tasks 
with different input and output modalities (i.e., an AV task and a VM task) will interfere 
with one another if performed simultaneously, because both tasks are competing for the 
same amodal resources (Anderson, 1996).  
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After sufficient practice, performance may rely on modality-specific control 
processes. The AV and VM tasks will no longer interfere with each other, because the 
tasks will demand control processes depending on their respective modalities. This can 
explain why participants were able to down-regulate their emotions while performing the 
perceptual-motor tasks. The energy needed for emotion regulation may have come from a 
general purpose source, but the control needed for the practiced perceptual-motor tasks 
was modality-specific. Thus the required control processes did not overlap. 
This study attempted to address issues that often go ignored in driving research, 
such as practice effects and emotion, but there were many limitations. Although some 
tentative inferences can be made about emotion regulation and its effects on easy, 
practiced perceptual-motor tasks, this study did not successfully address the effects of 
emotion regulation on driving. The pursuit tracking task poorly represents the multi-
faceted behavior of driving. Therefore, the results cannot be generalized to research that 
uses actual traffic or high-quality driving simulators, only research that uses easy 
laboratory tasks as proxies for driving. 
The driving subtask most similar to the pursuit tracking task is arguably 
steering/lane keeping. Some meta-analyses have reported that variables like driving speed 
and braking reaction time are more sensitive to cell phone interference than lane keeping 
(Horrey & Wickens, 2006). It is possible that participants would not have eliminated 
dual-task interference if the tracking task had been paired with a visual-manual RT task 
to represent braking. 
The sample size (N = 12) provided enough power for most of the within-subject 
variables of this study, but is too small to draw inferences for the between-subject 
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variable (emotion regulation or maintenance control instructions). The sample size was 
not increased because no trends emerged from the 12 participants to suggest any 
differences between the instruction groups. 
Plans for future research include investigating the effects of emotion regulation on 
unpracticed pursuit tracking and verbal tasks. It is predicted that, after only one session of 
practice, participants instructed to down-regulate negative emotions will perform more 
poorly than participants instructed to maintain any negative emotions because both tasks 
may rely on general purpose control.  
Driving a car is a usually well-practiced task that demands attention to multiple 
stimuli (e.g., lane position, other cars, traffic lights) as well as many motor responses 
(e.g., steering, accelerating, braking). Conversely, a pursuit tracking task like the one 
used in this study is easy but novel to most individuals. Adding a secondary task to either 
of these will likely impair performance, but this does not imply that the interference to 
those tasks is the same. A complicated, well-practiced task is fundamentally different 
from an easy, unpracticed task. 
Although the participants were able to eliminate dual-task interference with 
practice, the results are not evidence that people can safely drive while talking on a cell 
phone. Most motorists have extensive practice performing both activities simultaneously, 
yet epidemiological research of driving behavior suggests that the two cannot be 
performed together safely. This discrepancy between these data and the results of this 
study raises serious doubts about the ecological validity of using easy laboratory tasks to 
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